- No UK law generally bans ransomware payments, but that does not make a payment lawful. Sanctions, proceeds of crime and your insurance contract all constrain it, depending on who receives the money and how.
- Your UK GDPR notification duties run independently of the payment decision. Paying does not remove the duty to report a notifiable breach to the ICO within 72 hours, and the ICO has said it does not reduce penalties.
- Payment buys neither full recovery nor deletion. In Barracuda's 2025 survey, 41% of organisations that paid did not get all of their data back.
- Recovery options other than paying (clean backups, rebuild, free decryptors) should be examined in parallel from the first hours, not after negotiations start.
- Decide in advance who has authority to approve or refuse a payment, and record every decision during the incident.
The UK legal position
No UK law generally prohibits a victim from paying a ransomware demand. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes the attack a crime but says nothing about the victim. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 can be engaged by payments to criminals, and specialist lawyers advise on that question case by case.
The sharper legal risk sits in the sanctions regime. OFSI (the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation) enforces prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to designated persons. Since 2022, OFSI can impose civil penalties on a strict liability basis, so a breach can be penalised even if you did not know the recipient was designated. In 2023 and 2024 the UK, together with the US, designated individuals connected to Trickbot, Conti, Evil Corp and LockBit, including LockBit's alleged leader Dmitry Khoroshev.
Sanctions attach to people, entities and transactions, not to the name a ransomware brand uses. A group can rebrand, affiliates move between programmes, and the wallet you are asked to pay may belong to an intermediary. A search of the sanctions list for the group name is therefore not a clearance. A sanctions specialist needs to assess who is behind the attack, who controls the wallet, which intermediaries would handle the funds and which jurisdictions are involved (a US nexus can bring OFAC rules into play as well).
In July 2025 the government confirmed plans to ban ransomware payments by public sector bodies and operators of critical national infrastructure, and to require other organisations to notify the government before paying. At the time of writing these measures have not been enacted and no start date is set. Check the current position before relying on this article.
The NCSC and the NCA advise against paying, because payment funds criminal groups and gives no assurance of recovery. The NCA asks victims to report attacks whether or not they pay, which supports attribution and disruption work.
Notification duties do not wait for the payment decision
A ransomware attack is not automatically a reportable personal data breach. It becomes one when personal data is affected (encrypted and unavailable, accessed or exfiltrated) and the breach is likely to result in a risk to people's rights and freedoms. Under UK GDPR Article 33 you must then notify the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware of it. Where the risk is high, Article 34 requires you to tell the affected individuals without undue delay.
That clock runs from awareness, not from the end of negotiations. Paying does not take the breach out of scope, and in a joint letter of July 2022 the ICO and NCSC stated that paying a ransom does not reduce the risk to individuals and will not be treated as a mitigating factor in ICO enforcement. The ICO does take account of early engagement with the NCSC and law enforcement, and of the measures you had in place before the attack.
Other duties may apply alongside UK GDPR: notifications under the NIS Regulations for operators of essential services and relevant digital service providers, sector regulators such as the FCA, and contractual notice clauses with customers and suppliers. Map these in your incident response plan so that nobody has to look them up during the attack.
What payment does not buy you
Paying assumes that you will receive a working decryptor and that the attacker will delete what was stolen. Neither is reliable.
Decryption is not guaranteed
In Barracuda's Ransomware Insights Report 2025 (a survey of 2,000 IT and security decision makers across the US, Europe and Asia Pacific), 32% of ransomware victims paid, and 41% of those that paid did not get all of their data back. Decryptors supplied after payment can be slow, may fail on large or complex systems and can damage files. Even a working decryptor usually restores data more slowly than clean backups.
Data deletion cannot be verified
In double extortion, the attacker copies data before encrypting it and threatens to publish it. No technical mechanism lets you confirm that a criminal group has deleted its copy, and stolen data can be sold, reused or published later whatever was agreed.
Decryption does not mean the attacker has gone
A decryptor unlocks files. It does not reset compromised credentials, remove persistence mechanisms or close the entry point. CISA's ransomware guidance treats eradication (identifying how the attacker got in, removing their access and rebuilding affected systems from known good sources) as work that has to be done regardless of how data is recovered.
Paying is associated with repeat attacks
In Cybereason's 2022 survey "Ransomware: The True Cost to Business", 80% of organisations that paid a ransom reported a subsequent attack. That is a survey finding rather than proof that payment causes repeat attacks, but it shows that payment does not buy safety. An attacker who still has access, or who has learned that you pay, has reason to return.
Recovery options to examine first
Payment is one recovery route among several, and usually the last one considered. Have your incident response team assess these in parallel from the start:
- Backups and snapshots. Immutable or offline backups, storage snapshots and replicas may be intact even when online backups were encrypted. Confirm they are clean and restorable before relying on them.
- Free decryptors. The No More Ransom project publishes decryptors for some ransomware families. A specialist should identify the variant and test any tool on copies, not on the only remaining data.
- Clean rebuild. Rebuilding systems from known good images is often needed anyway to remove the attacker's access.
- Data held elsewhere. Cloud services, suppliers, partners and exports can hold copies of critical records.
- Continuity processes. Manual or alternative processes can keep essential services running while systems are restored.
Backups do not solve data theft. If data was exfiltrated, restoring from backup recovers availability but does not stop publication, so notification and communication work continues either way.
When organisations consider payment
Organisations do sometimes pay. The circumstances usually involve one or more of the following:
- No viable recovery route. Backups do not exist, were encrypted or are too old, and the data cannot be rebuilt from other sources.
- Harm from prolonged disruption. Where outages put people's safety or essential services at risk, the time needed to restore can carry a higher weight in the decision.
- Information on the threat actor. Incident response firms track how particular groups behave, including whether their decryptors work. That information can inform the decision but does not guarantee the outcome.
None of these factors overrides the legal checks. Before you can consider whether to pay, you need to know, as far as can be established, who would receive the money.
What to do before this decision matters
Preparation reduces the chance that you face the payment question at all.
- Backups designed for ransomware. Keep backups immutable, offline or logically isolated, protect the backup console with separate credentials and MFA, and test restoration regularly against your recovery time objectives. Backups that are permanently reachable over the network are often encrypted together with production systems.
- An incident response plan that covers the payment question. Record who has authority to approve or refuse a payment, who coordinates legal and sanctions advice, and who handles notifications to the ICO, the NCSC or NCA, and the insurer.
- An incident response retainer. A retainer can set agreed response times and give you access to forensic, attribution and negotiation expertise. Check that the provider is acceptable to your insurer.
- A cyber insurance policy you have read. Know the notification conditions, consent requirements, panel rules, sub-limits and exclusions before you need them.
For a step-by-step playbook covering the first 72 hours after an attack, see our ransomware response guide. For recovery once systems are down, see our ransomware recovery guide.
Insurance conditions that affect the decision
Many UK cyber policies cover extortion costs, but the cover comes with conditions. The wording of your policy decides what applies, so read it with your broker before an incident.
Notify early and in parallel
Policies usually require prompt notification of an incident and the insurer's prior written consent before any extortion payment. Paying without that consent can put cover for the payment at risk. Notify the insurer or broker early, in parallel with containment. Notification should never delay steps to contain the attack or protect people.
Sanctions screening
Policies generally exclude payments that would breach sanctions, and insurers carry out their own screening before consenting. Share the attribution evidence your response team gathers and allow time for that check.
Approved provider networks
Many insurers work with a network of approved incident response, legal and negotiation providers. Using a provider outside that network can affect whether their costs are covered, depending on the policy. Check this before signing a retainer.
Extortion sub-limits
The overall policy limit is not necessarily the amount available for extortion. A policy with a £2 million limit might carry a separate cyber extortion sub-limit of, for example, £250,000. Anything above the sub-limit would be yours to fund. Check your figure now.
War and state-backed attack exclusions
Lloyd's Market Bulletin Y5381 requires standalone cyber-attack policies written at Lloyd's and incepting or renewing from 31 March 2023 to exclude losses from war and from certain state-backed cyber attacks, specifically those that significantly impair a state's ability to function or its security capabilities. Policies must also set out a robust basis for attributing an attack to a state. Whether a particular ransomware incident falls within an exclusion depends on the policy wording, and most criminal ransomware attacks do not.
Any contact with the attacker should be handled by specialists working under your incident response lead, not by staff acting alone. Do not transfer funds until legal and sanctions advice has been obtained and recorded and the insurer has given written consent. Document every decision, every communication with the attacker and the evidence behind attribution.
A framework for the ransom decision
During an attack you will have incomplete information and an attacker pushing for speed. The framework below sets out the work that comes before any decision about payment. Phases 1 to 5 run in parallel from the first hours; phases 6 and 7 bring the results together.
Contain the attack, keep essential services running and preserve evidence (logs, ransom notes, affected systems).
Owner: incident response lead with IT and the forensic provider
Which systems and data are unavailable, and which data may have been copied or stolen?
Owner: forensic provider with data owners and the DPO
Can you recover from clean backups, snapshots, a rebuild or a free decryptor, and how long would that take?
Owner: IT and infrastructure with the forensic provider
What do sanctions, proceeds of crime, UK GDPR, sector rules, law enforcement reporting and contracts require or prohibit?
Owner: legal counsel with sanctions specialists and the DPO
What do the policy's notification, consent, panel, sub-limit and exclusion terms say?
Owner: risk or finance lead with the broker
Compare recovery without payment against the legal, operational and reputational consequences of each option.
Owner: crisis management team
The executives with pre-agreed authority take the decision and record the reasoning, the advice received and the evidence relied on.
Owner: authorised executives or the board
The earlier phases inform and narrow the options. If phase 3 finds a viable recovery route, or phase 4 finds a legal barrier, the payment question may be settled before phase 7.
This article provides general information and does not constitute legal advice. Sanctions designations and UK policy on ransomware payments change. Seek advice from lawyers with sanctions and cyber incident experience before any payment decision.