What is multi-factor authentication (MFA)? MFA is a security method that requires more than one authentication factor, combining categories such as something a person knows, has or is. Its purpose is to reduce the chance of unauthorised access when a password is compromised. Methods such as FIDO2 passkeys offer phishing-resistant protection, while SMS and TOTP codes remain exposed to certain social engineering and interception techniques.
- A 2023 Microsoft Research study of Azure AD (now Entra ID) accounts estimated that MFA reduced the risk of compromise by 99.22%; real-world effectiveness varies by method and by attack
- FIDO2 security keys and passkeys are phishing-resistant; TOTP codes, push and SMS can be defeated by real-time adversary-in-the-middle phishing
- Secure admin accounts and recovery functions first, then cover every employee, contractor and external identity, starting with email
- Policy exclusions, legacy authentication paths and weak recovery processes are the most common gaps; a high registration rate is not the same as real coverage
- ISO 27001, Cyber Essentials and NIS2 all expect strong authentication; Cyber Essentials requires MFA on cloud services wherever the service offers it
Why passwords alone keep failing
A password is a single secret. The moment that secret leaves your control, your account is open. Passwords leave your control through channels you have no visibility into.
Credential stuffing is the most common attack vector against business accounts. Attackers buy databases of email and password combinations leaked from breached websites, then run automated tools that test those credentials against Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, VPN gateways, and banking portals. The attack works because people reuse passwords. A credential leaked from a retail breach five years ago still opens accounts today, because the password never changed. HaveIBeenPwned currently indexes over 13 billion breached accounts.
Phishing hands credentials directly to attackers. A convincing login page for Microsoft 365 or your company's VPN portal takes under an hour to build and distribute. The user types their username and password into what looks like a legitimate form. Attackers capture the credentials in real time. No technical vulnerability required.
Password spraying takes the opposite approach to stuffing. Instead of trying many passwords against one account, attackers try one or two common passwords against thousands of accounts. Common choices like Summer2024! or Welcome1 succeed at scale because password policies that require a capital letter and a number produce predictable patterns, and a slow spray stays below lockout thresholds.
MFA stops most of these attempts, because a stolen or guessed password is no longer enough on its own. It is not absolute. Real-time adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits proxy the genuine sign-in page, relay the user's password and one-time code or push approval, and capture the session cookie that results. SMS, TOTP and push-based MFA can all be defeated this way; we cover the techniques and defences in how attackers bypass MFA. For administrators, finance staff and other high-risk accounts, use phishing-resistant methods.
The most cited figure comes from a 2023 Microsoft Research study, How effective is multifactor authentication at deterring cyberattacks?, of commercial Azure AD (now Entra ID) accounts investigated for suspicious activity in 2022. It estimated that MFA reduced the risk of compromise by 99.22% in that population. That is a measured result for that population, not a guarantee for every method or attack.
What MFA is and how it works
Multi-factor authentication requires a user to present two or more verification factors from distinct categories before gaining access. The three categories are:
- Something you know: a password, PIN, or security question answer
- Something you have: a physical device such as a phone running an authenticator app, a hardware security key, or a smart card
- Something you are: a biometric factor such as a fingerprint or face scan
Two-factor authentication (2FA) uses exactly two of these. MFA is the broader term covering two or more. In practice most people use the terms interchangeably, and most deployments combine a password with a device-based second factor.
An attacker who steals your password does not have your phone. An attacker who finds your phone does not know your password. Compromising both, against a specific target, at the moment of a login attempt, is far harder than stealing a password from a breached database and running it through an automated tool. That is why attackers now focus on the sign-in itself, and why the choice of method matters.
MFA methods and their level of protection
MFA methods differ most in one property: whether they resist phishing. NIST SP 800-63B-4 treats an authenticator as phishing-resistant only when its output is cryptographically bound to the genuine service or session, which rules out manually entered codes and push approvals. The right choice depends on the risk of the account and the assurance you need, not on a universal ranking.
FIDO2 security keys and passkeys resist phishing because each credential is scoped to the relying party ID, the domain of the genuine service, and the browser checks the origin of the page before it lets the authenticator respond. A look-alike phishing domain cannot obtain a valid response for the real service, even if the user is fooled. TOTP codes and push approvals carry no such binding: an adversary-in-the-middle proxy can capture the password and the code, or trigger the push, and replay them within seconds.
Number matching, which Microsoft now applies to all Microsoft Authenticator push notifications, makes the user type the number shown at sign-in. That stops MFA fatigue attacks, where repeated prompts are sent until a tired user taps "Approve". Push remains open to social engineering, such as a caller posing as the helpdesk.
SIM swap fraud is well documented: an attacker persuades a mobile operator to move your number to a SIM they control, and every SMS code follows it. Operator identity checks vary and are outside your control. Move business-critical accounts to phishing-resistant methods, or at minimum to an authenticator app, and remove SMS as a fallback option for those accounts.
How to roll out MFA
Our companion guide on rolling out MFA sets out the deployment sequence, starting with admin accounts and recovery functions, along with the four mistakes that leave the largest gaps, the Microsoft 365 and Entra ID settings to configure, and what ISO 27001, Cyber Essentials, NIS2 and GDPR expect.