- Stolen and reused credentials remain one of the main ways attackers get in, but their share varies by dataset and year. Verizon's 2026 DBIR reports vulnerability exploitation overtaking credential abuse as the leading initial access vector.
- AiTM proxies relay your credentials and MFA response to the real sign-in service, capture the session cookie and show the user a normal-looking login. SMS codes, TOTP and push approvals can all be relayed this way.
- FIDO2 passkeys and security keys resist AiTM phishing because each credential is scoped to the legitimate site's relying party ID and the browser checks the page origin. A lookalike domain cannot obtain a valid response.
- FIDO2 does not protect a session token stolen after a legitimate login. Against token replay, the main Microsoft controls are Token Protection (device-bound sign-in session tokens, for supported apps and platforms only), CAE for supported apps, endpoint protection, and fast detection and revocation.
- Number matching, now on by default for Microsoft Authenticator push, reduces accidental approvals in MFA fatigue attacks. It is not a guarantee: an attacker who talks the user through the prompt can still succeed.
- Prioritise phishing-resistant MFA for privileged accounts, lock down enrolment and recovery so they cannot be used as a back door, restrict OAuth consent, and have a tested response for suspected token theft.
Credentials remain a major breach vector
Breach reporting through the 2010s centred on malware: ransomware groups, nation-state implants, zero-day exploits. Attackers have since put far more effort into credential theft. It is cheap, it scales, and it is hard to spot. A legitimate account signing in through an authorised identity provider looks like a normal login to most monitoring systems.
How large a share credentials account for depends on the dataset. Verizon's DBIR has for years linked stolen credentials to a large majority of hacking-related breaches, which is a narrower category than all breaches. Its 2026 edition reports vulnerability exploitation overtaking credential abuse as the most common initial access vector, while credential misuse still shows up at later stages of many attacks. The fair reading: credentials are one of the main vectors, not the only one.
Supply is not a problem for attackers. Breach aggregators such as Have I Been Pwned index billions of breached accounts. That figure counts account records exposed in breaches, not unique people or credentials that still work, but infostealer logs add fresh passwords and session cookies on top. Stuffing tools test these at scale with throttling and IP rotation to avoid rate limits.
MFA stops most credential stuffing and automated password attacks. Attackers adapted. Some techniques now target the session created after sign-in, or the user's consent, rather than the password. SMS codes, TOTP and push approvals offer little protection against those.
Headline percentages depend on what is counted: all breaches or only hacking-related ones, the first step of an attack or any step, one year or several. When a report quotes a credential figure, check its scope before you put it in a business case.
Six techniques that compromise identities or get around MFA protections
Not all of these defeat MFA directly. Some steal what MFA produces (a session), some exploit a weak MFA method, and some work where MFA is missing or never challenged. A control that stops credential stuffing may do nothing against session token theft.
What each MFA type actually stops
The MFA method you choose determines which attacks still work. SMS codes, TOTP and push notifications stop most credential stuffing. None of them stops a real-time AiTM proxy. Knowing where each method's protection ends tells you what to upgrade first.
* FIDO2 blocks AiTM phishing at sign-in but does not protect session tokens after a legitimate login. Session replay needs separate controls: Token Protection where supported, endpoint protection against infostealers, CAE, and detection with session revocation.
What makes FIDO2 different
SMS codes, TOTP codes and push approvals share one property: they can be relayed. The user completes the challenge and the proxy passes it on. The session opens. The proxy takes the cookie.
FIDO2 works differently. When a passkey or security key is registered, the credential is scoped to the service's relying party ID (for Microsoft Entra, login.microsoft.com), and the private key never leaves the authenticator. At sign-in, the browser checks that the page's origin matches that relying party ID before it lets the authenticator respond. The authenticator then signs the server's challenge together with data bound to the relying party. A phishing page on login-microsoft-365.com cannot ask for a response for login.microsoft.com, so the proxy has nothing valid to relay.
NIST SP 800-63B treats this kind of binding to the genuine service as phishing resistance. Both CISA and the NCSC recommend phishing-resistant MFA for high-value accounts.
Enrolment and recovery decide how strong it really is
Phishing-resistant MFA is only as strong as the way people enrol and recover. If the helpdesk resets MFA after a caller answers a few questions, if Temporary Access Passes are issued without proper identity checks, or if users can still fall back to SMS or push, attackers simply target that path. Require strong identity verification for resets, restrict who can issue Temporary Access Passes and keep them short-lived, and remove weaker methods for accounts that have moved to passkeys.
A user who receives repeated push requests may approve one just to stop the noise. Number matching, now enabled by default for Microsoft Authenticator push, makes a reflexive approval much less likely because the user has to type the number shown on the sign-in screen. It does not help if the attacker persuades the user to read out or enter the number. Treat it as a baseline, and move high-risk users to phishing-resistant methods.
How to defend against these attacks
Phishing-resistant sign-in closes the AiTM route, but stolen sessions need controls of their own. Our companion guide on defending against MFA bypass covers session-layer defences such as Token Protection and CAE, the accounts to protect first, seven controls to implement now and what to do if you suspect token theft.
Ryland has delivered cybersecurity, compliance, and IT management programmes for regulated organisations across the UK and the Netherlands for over 20 years. View full profile