- DORA has applied since 17 January 2025 to 20 categories of financial entity listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t). ICT third-party service providers are treated separately.
- Financial entities carry the obligations. Ordinary ICT suppliers are not directly supervised under DORA; they receive requirements through contracts. Direct EU oversight applies only to designated critical ICT third-party providers (CTPPs).
- For a major ICT-related incident, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it.
- Testing is proportionate. Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) applies only to entities identified by their competent authority, at least every three years.
- Threat intelligence sharing under Article 45 is voluntary. Not taking part is not non-compliance.
Who DORA covers, and who it does not
DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) applies to financial entities in the 20 categories listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t). They include credit institutions, payment institutions, electronic money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, credit rating agencies and trade repositories, among others. ICT third-party service providers appear separately in point (u). They are not financial entities, and DORA reaches most of them through their clients' contracts.
This article covers what DORA requires and who is covered. For how to assess your organisation against those requirements and plan remediation, see our DORA gap analysis guide.
The most common misunderstanding concerns ICT suppliers. The obligations sit with the financial entity: it manages ICT third-party risk, puts the required clauses into its contracts and keeps the Register of Information. Ordinary ICT suppliers are not directly supervised under DORA. They feel its effect through contract terms, audit and access rights and information requests from their financial-sector clients. Direct EU-level oversight applies only to ICT third-party service providers that the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have designated as critical (CTPPs) under Articles 31 to 44, through a Lead Overseer. The ESAs published the first list of designated CTPPs on 18 November 2025.
| Who | Position under DORA | What to expect |
|---|---|---|
| EU financial entity | Directly subject to DORA (Article 2(1)(a) to (t)) | Supervision by its national competent authority on ICT risk, incidents, testing and third-party risk |
| Ordinary ICT supplier | Not a financial entity and not directly supervised | Article 30 contract clauses, audit and access rights, information requests and cooperation obligations agreed with clients |
| Designated CTPP | Overseen directly at EU level (Articles 31 to 44) | Oversight by a Lead Overseer, including information requests, investigations, inspections and recommendations |
| UK supplier to EU financial entities | A third-country ICT supplier; not directly supervised unless designated | Contractual requirements from EU clients, as for any other supplier; EU oversight only if designated as a CTPP |
Two distinctions help. A CTPP is not the same as a supplier that supports a critical or important function at a particular entity: CTPP designation is an EU-wide decision by the ESAs, while each financial entity decides which of its own functions are critical or important. And ICT third-party arrangements are broader than traditional outsourcing: DORA covers contractual arrangements for ICT services in general, including software, cloud and data services that were never treated as outsourcing.
For UK firms, DORA applies to EU-authorised entities in their group and shapes the contracts they sign as ICT suppliers to EU financial entities. In the UK itself, the PRA and FCA operational resilience rules (in force since 31 March 2022) and the UK critical third parties regime, under which HM Treasury can designate providers for oversight by the Bank of England, PRA and FCA, form a separate framework. Meeting one regime does not demonstrate compliance with the other.
The five pillars: what each one requires
DORA's requirements are often described as five pillars. Treat this as an explanatory model: the obligations sit in specific articles of the regulation and in the technical standards adopted under it. They apply proportionately (Article 4), in line with the entity's size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of its activities, and some smaller entities apply the simplified framework in Article 16.
ICT risk management. Financial entities need a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework (Article 6) covering identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving, and communication. It is reviewed at least once a year and after major ICT-related incidents. The management body defines, approves and oversees the framework and bears ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk (Article 5).
Incident management and reporting. Financial entities classify ICT-related incidents using the criteria and materiality thresholds in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. Under its Article 8, an incident is major only if it affects critical services and either involves successful, malicious and unauthorised access that may result in data losses, or meets at least two other materiality thresholds. For major ICT-related incidents, Article 5 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 sets the deadlines:
- Initial notification. As early as possible, within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. If the incident is only classified as major more than 24 hours after awareness, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification.
- Intermediate report. Within 72 hours of the initial notification, with updated reports when the status changes and when regular activities have been recovered.
- Final report. No later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.
- Day 1, 09:00. The team becomes aware of the incident. The 24-hour limit starts.
- Day 1, 14:00. The incident is classified as major. The initial notification is due by 18:00, which is within 24 hours of awareness.
- Day 1, 17:30. The initial notification is submitted. The intermediate report is due by 17:30 on day 4.
- After recovery. The final report is due no later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.
- Late classification. Had the incident only been classified as major at 12:00 on day 2, 27 hours after awareness, the initial notification would have been due by 16:00 on day 2.
Where a deadline falls on a weekend or public holiday, some entities may submit by noon on the next working day; that extension does not apply to initial notifications and intermediate reports from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues and entities identified as essential or important under NIS2. If the incident is also a personal data breach, GDPR notification may apply as well, under its own criteria.
Digital operational resilience testing. Every financial entity other than a microenterprise needs a proportionate, risk-based testing programme (Article 24). ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly (Article 24(6)). TLPT is an additional requirement only for entities identified by their competent authority.
ICT third-party risk management. Financial entities manage ICT third-party risk as part of their ICT risk management framework (Articles 28 to 30), keep a Register of Information covering all contractual arrangements for ICT services and include the contract terms required by Article 30.
Information sharing. Article 45 allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence within trusted communities, subject to safeguards for sensitive information, data protection and competition rules. Participation is voluntary. Entities that join such an arrangement notify their competent authority; entities that do not join are not in breach of DORA.
Third-party ICT risk: what deserves particular attention
Third-party risk deserves particular attention because DORA's requirements go beyond a typical supplier questionnaire. Whether your organisation has gaps here can only be determined by reviewing your agreements and controls against the requirements.
The Register of Information (Article 28(3)) covers all contractual arrangements for the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, not only those supporting critical or important functions, and distinguishes the arrangements that do. It is kept at entity level and at sub-consolidated and consolidated levels and follows the templates in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956. Subcontracting is recorded in the fields those templates require, not as an informal multi-tier supplier list. Building it may require information your organisation does not yet hold in a structured form.
The contractual requirements come in two layers. Article 30(2) sets terms for every contract for ICT services, such as a clear description of the services, the locations where data is processed, data protection provisions, assistance with ICT incidents, cooperation with competent authorities and termination rights. Article 30(3) adds further terms for services supporting critical or important functions, including full service level descriptions, notice periods, participation in TLPT, unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit, and exit strategies. Agreements signed before DORA may need amending; which ones depends on a clause-by-clause review. Our article on DORA Article 30 contract clauses covers them in detail.
The stronger access, inspection and audit rights in Article 30(3) apply to ICT services supporting critical or important functions. How an entity exercises them can vary: pooled audits organised with other clients and third-party assurance, such as certifications and independent audit reports, can form part of the approach, as long as the entity still meets the legal requirements. Assess each agreement on its own terms rather than assuming that a standard provider contract is compliant or non-compliant.
Concentration risk is addressed directly. Before entering into arrangements for services supporting critical or important functions, financial entities assess ICT concentration risk (Article 29). If payment processing, the core platform and disaster recovery all depend on the same cloud provider, that concentration risk should be assessed and documented.
Resilience testing and TLPT
Article 25 lists the tests a programme can draw on, including vulnerability assessments and scans, network security assessments, gap analyses, scenario-based tests, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing. These are options chosen according to the entity's risks and context. DORA does not require every entity to run every technique every year.
TLPT under Article 26 applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority, based on impact-related factors, financial stability concerns and the entity's ICT risk profile and maturity. Identified entities carry out TLPT at least every three years, although the authority can set a different frequency. The test covers several or all critical or important functions on live production systems, uses threat intelligence relevant to the entity, and its scope is validated by the competent authority before the test begins. The method is set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, which is aligned with the TIBER-EU framework.
Article 27 and the TLPT technical standards set requirements for testers: suitability and reputation, technical and organisational capabilities including threat intelligence, certification by an accreditation body or adherence to formal codes of conduct or ethical frameworks, independent assurance, and professional indemnity insurance. Internal testers may be used only under conditions, including approval by the competent authority, and the threat intelligence provider must always be external. TIBER-EU is a methodology, not a certification every tester must hold. TIBER-GB, the Bank of England framework for UK-regulated firms, does not automatically satisfy DORA obligations.
Three priorities, and the evidence to keep
If your DORA programme is still in progress, these three areas may be relevant priorities.
What evidence to keep
| DORA area | Practical evidence |
|---|---|
| ICT risk management | Approved framework and strategy, asset inventory, mapping of critical or important functions, annual review records, continuity and recovery tests |
| Incident management | Classification records with time of awareness and time of classification, notifications and reports submitted, post-incident reviews |
| Resilience testing | Testing programme, rationale for the tests chosen, results and tracked remediation |
| Third-party risk | Register of Information, pre-contract risk assessments, contracts with Article 30 terms, subcontracting information, exit strategies |
| Governance | Management body decisions, reporting to the management body, assigned responsibilities, ICT risk training |
| TLPT, where applicable | The authority's identification, validated scope, test results, remediation plan |
| Information sharing | Records of voluntary participation and notification to the authority, if you take part; not a requirement |
DORA is supervised by national competent authorities in each Member State, such as DNB and AFM in the Netherlands. In the UK, the PRA and FCA supervise the separate UK framework. An entity that can show documented evidence of a structured programme is in a better position to demonstrate compliance than one that treats DORA as a documentation exercise only.
For payment firms that also handle card data, PCI DSS covers some related ground on third-party risk and incident response, although it is a separate standard. Our PCI DSS compliance guide covers the card security standards in detail.
The DORA regulation is published on EUR-Lex (Regulation 2022/2554). The European Supervisory Authorities publish the regulatory and implementing technical standards and guidelines on ICT risk management, incident classification and third-party oversight, for example at eba.europa.eu.