Guide Compliance Financial Services

DORA: cybersecurity and ICT risk management requirements

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) has applied since 17 January 2025. It sets requirements for ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing and the management of ICT third-party providers, and the obligations vary with the category of financial entity and the services it uses. For firms that rely on cloud, software and infrastructure providers, compliance needs more than internal policies: it needs adequate contracts, a Register of Information and evidence of supplier oversight. This article explains what DORA requires and who is covered.

6 May 2026
Updated 18 November 2026
12 min read
Key takeaways
  • DORA has applied since 17 January 2025 to 20 categories of financial entity listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t). ICT third-party service providers are treated separately.
  • Financial entities carry the obligations. Ordinary ICT suppliers are not directly supervised under DORA; they receive requirements through contracts. Direct EU oversight applies only to designated critical ICT third-party providers (CTPPs).
  • For a major ICT-related incident, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it.
  • Testing is proportionate. Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) applies only to entities identified by their competent authority, at least every three years.
  • Threat intelligence sharing under Article 45 is voluntary. Not taking part is not non-compliance.

Who DORA covers, and who it does not

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) applies to financial entities in the 20 categories listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t). They include credit institutions, payment institutions, electronic money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, credit rating agencies and trade repositories, among others. ICT third-party service providers appear separately in point (u). They are not financial entities, and DORA reaches most of them through their clients' contracts.

This article covers what DORA requires and who is covered. For how to assess your organisation against those requirements and plan remediation, see our DORA gap analysis guide.

The most common misunderstanding concerns ICT suppliers. The obligations sit with the financial entity: it manages ICT third-party risk, puts the required clauses into its contracts and keeps the Register of Information. Ordinary ICT suppliers are not directly supervised under DORA. They feel its effect through contract terms, audit and access rights and information requests from their financial-sector clients. Direct EU-level oversight applies only to ICT third-party service providers that the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have designated as critical (CTPPs) under Articles 31 to 44, through a Lead Overseer. The ESAs published the first list of designated CTPPs on 18 November 2025.

WhoPosition under DORAWhat to expect
EU financial entityDirectly subject to DORA (Article 2(1)(a) to (t))Supervision by its national competent authority on ICT risk, incidents, testing and third-party risk
Ordinary ICT supplierNot a financial entity and not directly supervisedArticle 30 contract clauses, audit and access rights, information requests and cooperation obligations agreed with clients
Designated CTPPOverseen directly at EU level (Articles 31 to 44)Oversight by a Lead Overseer, including information requests, investigations, inspections and recommendations
UK supplier to EU financial entitiesA third-country ICT supplier; not directly supervised unless designatedContractual requirements from EU clients, as for any other supplier; EU oversight only if designated as a CTPP

Two distinctions help. A CTPP is not the same as a supplier that supports a critical or important function at a particular entity: CTPP designation is an EU-wide decision by the ESAs, while each financial entity decides which of its own functions are critical or important. And ICT third-party arrangements are broader than traditional outsourcing: DORA covers contractual arrangements for ICT services in general, including software, cloud and data services that were never treated as outsourcing.

For UK firms, DORA applies to EU-authorised entities in their group and shapes the contracts they sign as ICT suppliers to EU financial entities. In the UK itself, the PRA and FCA operational resilience rules (in force since 31 March 2022) and the UK critical third parties regime, under which HM Treasury can designate providers for oversight by the Bank of England, PRA and FCA, form a separate framework. Meeting one regime does not demonstrate compliance with the other.

Jan 2025
DORA became applicable across all EU member states
20
categories of financial entity in Article 2(1)(a) to (t)
3 years
minimum TLPT cycle for entities identified by their competent authority

The five pillars: what each one requires

DORA's requirements are often described as five pillars. Treat this as an explanatory model: the obligations sit in specific articles of the regulation and in the technical standards adopted under it. They apply proportionately (Article 4), in line with the entity's size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of its activities, and some smaller entities apply the simplified framework in Article 16.

ICT risk management. Financial entities need a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework (Article 6) covering identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving, and communication. It is reviewed at least once a year and after major ICT-related incidents. The management body defines, approves and oversees the framework and bears ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk (Article 5).

Incident management and reporting. Financial entities classify ICT-related incidents using the criteria and materiality thresholds in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. Under its Article 8, an incident is major only if it affects critical services and either involves successful, malicious and unauthorised access that may result in data losses, or meets at least two other materiality thresholds. For major ICT-related incidents, Article 5 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 sets the deadlines:

  • Initial notification. As early as possible, within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. If the incident is only classified as major more than 24 hours after awareness, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification.
  • Intermediate report. Within 72 hours of the initial notification, with updated reports when the status changes and when regular activities have been recovered.
  • Final report. No later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.
Example timeline
  1. Day 1, 09:00. The team becomes aware of the incident. The 24-hour limit starts.
  2. Day 1, 14:00. The incident is classified as major. The initial notification is due by 18:00, which is within 24 hours of awareness.
  3. Day 1, 17:30. The initial notification is submitted. The intermediate report is due by 17:30 on day 4.
  4. After recovery. The final report is due no later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.
  5. Late classification. Had the incident only been classified as major at 12:00 on day 2, 27 hours after awareness, the initial notification would have been due by 16:00 on day 2.

Where a deadline falls on a weekend or public holiday, some entities may submit by noon on the next working day; that extension does not apply to initial notifications and intermediate reports from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues and entities identified as essential or important under NIS2. If the incident is also a personal data breach, GDPR notification may apply as well, under its own criteria.

Digital operational resilience testing. Every financial entity other than a microenterprise needs a proportionate, risk-based testing programme (Article 24). ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly (Article 24(6)). TLPT is an additional requirement only for entities identified by their competent authority.

ICT third-party risk management. Financial entities manage ICT third-party risk as part of their ICT risk management framework (Articles 28 to 30), keep a Register of Information covering all contractual arrangements for ICT services and include the contract terms required by Article 30.

Information sharing. Article 45 allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence within trusted communities, subject to safeguards for sensitive information, data protection and competition rules. Participation is voluntary. Entities that join such an arrangement notify their competent authority; entities that do not join are not in breach of DORA.

Third-party ICT risk: what deserves particular attention

Third-party risk deserves particular attention because DORA's requirements go beyond a typical supplier questionnaire. Whether your organisation has gaps here can only be determined by reviewing your agreements and controls against the requirements.

The Register of Information (Article 28(3)) covers all contractual arrangements for the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, not only those supporting critical or important functions, and distinguishes the arrangements that do. It is kept at entity level and at sub-consolidated and consolidated levels and follows the templates in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956. Subcontracting is recorded in the fields those templates require, not as an informal multi-tier supplier list. Building it may require information your organisation does not yet hold in a structured form.

The contractual requirements come in two layers. Article 30(2) sets terms for every contract for ICT services, such as a clear description of the services, the locations where data is processed, data protection provisions, assistance with ICT incidents, cooperation with competent authorities and termination rights. Article 30(3) adds further terms for services supporting critical or important functions, including full service level descriptions, notice periods, participation in TLPT, unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit, and exit strategies. Agreements signed before DORA may need amending; which ones depends on a clause-by-clause review. Our article on DORA Article 30 contract clauses covers them in detail.

Audit rights in practice

The stronger access, inspection and audit rights in Article 30(3) apply to ICT services supporting critical or important functions. How an entity exercises them can vary: pooled audits organised with other clients and third-party assurance, such as certifications and independent audit reports, can form part of the approach, as long as the entity still meets the legal requirements. Assess each agreement on its own terms rather than assuming that a standard provider contract is compliant or non-compliant.

Concentration risk is addressed directly. Before entering into arrangements for services supporting critical or important functions, financial entities assess ICT concentration risk (Article 29). If payment processing, the core platform and disaster recovery all depend on the same cloud provider, that concentration risk should be assessed and documented.

Resilience testing and TLPT

Article 25 lists the tests a programme can draw on, including vulnerability assessments and scans, network security assessments, gap analyses, scenario-based tests, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing. These are options chosen according to the entity's risks and context. DORA does not require every entity to run every technique every year.

TLPT under Article 26 applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority, based on impact-related factors, financial stability concerns and the entity's ICT risk profile and maturity. Identified entities carry out TLPT at least every three years, although the authority can set a different frequency. The test covers several or all critical or important functions on live production systems, uses threat intelligence relevant to the entity, and its scope is validated by the competent authority before the test begins. The method is set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, which is aligned with the TIBER-EU framework.

Article 27 and the TLPT technical standards set requirements for testers: suitability and reputation, technical and organisational capabilities including threat intelligence, certification by an accreditation body or adherence to formal codes of conduct or ethical frameworks, independent assurance, and professional indemnity insurance. Internal testers may be used only under conditions, including approval by the competent authority, and the threat intelligence provider must always be external. TIBER-EU is a methodology, not a certification every tester must hold. TIBER-GB, the Bank of England framework for UK-regulated firms, does not automatically satisfy DORA obligations.

Three priorities, and the evidence to keep

If your DORA programme is still in progress, these three areas may be relevant priorities.

1
Build the Register of Information to the templates
Use the templates in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956 rather than existing supplier lists, and include all ICT contractual arrangements. National authorities set the submission timetable.
2
Review ICT contracts against Article 30
Check every contract for the Article 30(2) terms and contracts for critical or important functions for the Article 30(3) terms. Prioritise amendments by criticality and assess concentration risk alongside.
3
Confirm your testing obligations
Make sure the testing programme covers systems supporting critical or important functions each year. Confirm with your competent authority whether you have been identified for TLPT and, if so, when the next test is due.

What evidence to keep

DORA areaPractical evidence
ICT risk managementApproved framework and strategy, asset inventory, mapping of critical or important functions, annual review records, continuity and recovery tests
Incident managementClassification records with time of awareness and time of classification, notifications and reports submitted, post-incident reviews
Resilience testingTesting programme, rationale for the tests chosen, results and tracked remediation
Third-party riskRegister of Information, pre-contract risk assessments, contracts with Article 30 terms, subcontracting information, exit strategies
GovernanceManagement body decisions, reporting to the management body, assigned responsibilities, ICT risk training
TLPT, where applicableThe authority's identification, validated scope, test results, remediation plan
Information sharingRecords of voluntary participation and notification to the authority, if you take part; not a requirement

DORA is supervised by national competent authorities in each Member State, such as DNB and AFM in the Netherlands. In the UK, the PRA and FCA supervise the separate UK framework. An entity that can show documented evidence of a structured programme is in a better position to demonstrate compliance than one that treats DORA as a documentation exercise only.

For payment firms that also handle card data, PCI DSS covers some related ground on third-party risk and incident response, although it is a separate standard. Our PCI DSS compliance guide covers the card security standards in detail.

The DORA regulation is published on EUR-Lex (Regulation 2022/2554). The European Supervisory Authorities publish the regulatory and implementing technical standards and guidelines on ICT risk management, incident classification and third-party oversight, for example at eba.europa.eu.

Frequently asked questions

What is DORA and who does it apply to?

DORA (the Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) is an EU regulation that has applied since 17 January 2025. It applies to the 20 categories of financial entity listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t), including credit institutions, payment institutions, investment firms, insurers and crypto-asset service providers. ICT third-party service providers are treated separately: only those designated as critical are overseen directly at EU level.

Does DORA apply to every ICT supplier of European banks?

Not directly. The obligations sit with the financial entities. Ordinary ICT suppliers, including UK suppliers, receive requirements through their contracts, such as audit and access rights, incident assistance and exit provisions. Only ICT providers designated as critical (CTPPs) by the European Supervisory Authorities fall under direct EU oversight.

What are the five pillars of DORA?

DORA is commonly explained through five pillars: ICT risk management, incident management and reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third-party risk management, and information sharing. The pillars are an explanatory model; the obligations sit in specific articles and technical standards and apply proportionately. Information sharing under Article 45 is voluntary.

What does DORA require in contracts with ICT providers?

Article 30(2) sets terms for every contract for ICT services, including a description of the services, data processing locations, data protection, incident assistance, cooperation with competent authorities and termination rights. Article 30(3) adds terms for services supporting critical or important functions, such as service levels, participation in TLPT, access, inspection and audit rights, and exit strategies. Whether an existing agreement needs amending depends on a review of its clauses.

Does the Register of Information include non-critical ICT contracts?

Yes. The register covers all contractual arrangements for ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, and identifies which of them support critical or important functions. Its structure follows the templates in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956.

What is TLPT and how often is it required?

Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) simulates the tactics of real threat actors against live production systems supporting critical or important functions. Under Article 26, entities identified by their competent authority carry out TLPT at least every three years, unless the authority sets a different frequency. Testers must meet the requirements of Article 27 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190.

Do all fintechs have to carry out TLPT every three years?

No. TLPT applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority. Other financial entities, apart from microenterprises, need a proportionate testing programme under Article 24 in which systems supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly.

Is threat intelligence sharing mandatory under DORA?

No. Article 45 allows financial entities to share cyber threat information within trusted communities, but participation is voluntary. Entities that join an arrangement notify their competent authority. Not taking part is not a breach of DORA.

How does DORA interact with GDPR and NIS2?

DORA incident reports go to the financial supervisor. If an incident also involves a personal data breach, GDPR notification to the data protection authority may apply under its own criteria. For NIS2, DORA is a sector-specific Union legal act: under NIS2 Article 4 and recital 28, its requirements for financial entities take the place of the equivalent NIS2 cybersecurity risk management and reporting provisions, rather than both applying cumulatively.

Ada Bicker
About the author
Cybersecurity Consultant, Cyvra

Ada has more than five years' experience in information security, ISO 27001, SOC 2 and EU compliance, and writes about DORA, the EU AI Act and NIS2. View full profile

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Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, or professional advice. Cyvra makes no warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of this content, which may not reflect the most current regulatory developments. Readers should seek independent legal and regulatory advice appropriate to their specific circumstances. Cyvra accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this content.