Analysis Cybersecurity Hospitality

Hotel cybersecurity: key risks and how to reduce them

Hotels rely on many connected systems to run reservations, payments, room access and guest services. That integration widens the attack surface and calls for specific attention to identities, networks, suppliers and personal data. A single incident can disrupt operations and affect guest privacy at the same time. This overview covers the main risks in hotel environments and the controls that reduce the likelihood and impact of a compromise, with links to our specialist hotel guides.

10 May 2026
Updated 18 November 2026
11 min read
Key takeaways
  • Marriott identified about 383 million guest records as the upper limit involved in the Starwood incident; MGM estimated a US$100 million hit to Adjusted Property EBITDAR after its 2023 attack
  • The main exposure points are the PMS, payment systems, guest Wi-Fi, booking channels and OTA accounts, staff identities and supplier remote access
  • Network segmentation matters, but it works alongside phishing-resistant MFA, vulnerability management, payment security, supplier control and incident response
  • Controller and processor roles depend on each processing activity; OTAs generally act as independent controllers for their own platforms
  • Under UK GDPR, a breach must be reported to the ICO within 72 hours unless it is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals

Why hotels attract attackers

Marriott disclosed the Starwood guest reservation database incident in 2018. After its investigation, the company identified approximately 383 million guest records as the upper limit of records involved, and stressed that this did not mean 383 million unique guests, because many guests appeared in the database more than once (Marriott update, January 2019). In September 2023, a cyberattack on MGM Resorts disrupted systems across its properties. In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, MGM estimated a negative impact of approximately US$100 million on Adjusted Property EBITDAR for its Las Vegas Strip and regional operations, plus less than US$10 million in one-time expenses for the quarter (MGM Form 8-K, October 2023).

Several factors tend to coincide in hotels. They handle different categories of personal data (identity details, contact data, stay history, payment information). They run many connected systems from different suppliers. Front desk teams change often and work under time pressure. Operations run around the clock, so any outage is felt by guests immediately. None of this makes a breach inevitable, but together these factors explain why criminal groups and other threat actors keep targeting the sector.

383M
guest records identified by Marriott as the upper limit involved in the Starwood incident (not unique guests)
~US$100M
estimated negative impact on MGM's Adjusted Property EBITDAR after the September 2023 attack
72h
UK GDPR deadline to notify the ICO, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals

The main attack surfaces in a hotel

Hotel environments often combine guest networks, operational systems (PMS, POS, door locks, CCTV, building management), supplier devices and corporate applications such as email and Microsoft 365. Where segmentation is insufficient, a compromise in one area can reach the others and widen the exposure. The practical question is not whether VLANs exist, but which communication paths are actually allowed between zones and whether anyone has tested them.

Property management systems

The PMS holds guest profiles, reservations, room allocation, folios and, depending on the setup, payment tokens. What an attacker can reach after compromising a PMS account depends on that account's privileges and on the architecture. A cloud PMS with role-based access and tokenised payment data exposes far less than an on-premises installation where a shared administrator account can export the entire guest database. Outdated installations do exist and deserve attention, but many hotels run current or vendor-hosted versions, so the patch status has to be checked rather than assumed.

The core controls are role-based access, so that front desk users see only what they need; individual accounts with strong authentication, with MFA as a minimum for administrators and remote access; protection of integrations such as API keys, interface accounts and service accounts; and monitoring of exports, privilege changes and unusual logins.

POS and payment systems

POS malware campaigns have hit hotel restaurants and bars in the past, capturing card data on compromised terminals or servers. How exposed a hotel is today depends on its payment architecture: certified payment terminals, point-to-point encryption (P2PE), tokenisation, integrated payment gateways and the actual flow of card data all change what an attacker could capture. Following PCI DSS scoping, start by identifying every component that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data, or that can affect its security, and keep that environment as small and isolated as possible. Our guide to PCI DSS for hotels covers scoping in detail.

Guest Wi-Fi

Guest Wi-Fi should give guests internet access and nothing else. Risk arises when guest traffic can reach internal systems, management interfaces or other guests' devices. VLANs on their own are not enough. What matters is routing controls, firewall policies that deny traffic from guest networks to internal zones by default, client isolation between guests, and periodic testing that confirms the separation works as designed. Our article on guest Wi-Fi network segmentation in hotels sets out a step-by-step approach.

Booking engine, OTAs and email

Hotels receive bookings through their own website and through online travel agencies (OTAs) such as Booking.com and Expedia, usually via a channel manager. In recent years attackers have repeatedly targeted the accounts rather than the integrations. A message posing as an OTA or a guest asks front desk staff to log in or open a file, and the stolen credentials are then used to access the OTA extranet or a mailbox and send guests fake payment requests. Protect these accounts with MFA (phishing-resistant methods where the platform supports them), individual user accounts instead of shared logins, a secure account recovery procedure and a fast way to revoke access when staff leave.

Third-party remote access

Hotels depend on suppliers who often need remote access: PMS integrators, POS providers, door-lock vendors, Wi-Fi contractors and outsourced IT. Every remote connection is a possible entry point. Give each supplier named accounts rather than shared ones, require MFA, grant the least privilege needed, make access time-limited where feasible (enabled on request for a defined window), log sessions and revoke access when a contract ends or an engineer leaves the supplier.

A compact hotel security assessment

The table below summarises the areas to review in a hotel, the main concern in each and examples of evidence that show whether the controls actually work.

AreaMain concernExample evidence
PMSExcessive privileges, shared accounts, unprotected integrationsUser and role list, MFA settings, integration inventory, export logs
POS and paymentsCard data captured or stored outside protected componentsCard data flow diagram, P2PE or tokenisation confirmation, PCI DSS scope document
Guest Wi-FiGuest traffic reaching internal systems or other guestsFirewall rules between zones, client isolation settings, segmentation test results
Booking engine and OTAsAccount takeover leading to guest fraudOTA user list, MFA status, recovery procedure, alert settings
Identity and Microsoft 365Credential theft through phishing, weak protection of admin accountsConditional access policies, MFA coverage report, admin role review
Physical access and IoT (locks, CCTV, smart rooms)Default credentials, flat networks, unsupported firmwareDevice inventory, firmware versions, network placement, supplier access list
Backup and recoveryBackups encrypted by ransomware or never restoredOffline or immutable copies, restore test records, recovery time targets
SuppliersUncontrolled remote access and unclear responsibilitiesSupplier register, security clauses in contracts, remote access logs

UK GDPR obligations to get right

Controller and processor roles are not fixed by the type of supplier. They depend on who determines the purposes and essential means of each processing activity. A PMS provider usually acts as a processor for the guest records it handles on the hotel's instructions, but it can be a controller for its own purposes, such as billing its customers. OTAs such as Booking.com and Expedia generally act as independent controllers for the processing on their own platforms, where they have their own relationship with the guest and their own privacy terms. Channel managers, booking engines and restaurant reservation tools need the same assessment, activity by activity. Contracts and data-sharing arrangements, whether a processing agreement under Article 28 or a controller-to-controller arrangement, must reflect the real roles. Our GDPR compliance guide explains the distinction.

Retention should be defined per data category and purpose, not as one period for all guest data. Document each period and the reason for it, review it regularly and delete or anonymise the data when the period ends.

Record typeRetention considerations
Registration dataGuest registration requirements set which details are needed and for how long; keep only those fields
Tax invoices and accounting recordsStatutory tax and accounting retention periods apply
Payment recordsSensitive authentication data must not be stored after authorisation; any stored card numbers must be protected under PCI DSS; transaction records follow accounting needs
Guest communicationsKeep while needed to handle the stay, complaints or claims, then delete
Loyalty programme dataKeep while the membership is active, with a defined period after inactivity
Passport or ID imagesOnly where necessity and a legal basis are established; short, justified retention and a documented deletion procedure

Passport and ID copies need a careful assessment. Collecting and keeping images of identity documents must be justified by purpose, necessity and legal basis. Needing certain identity details, for example the guest records required under the Immigration (Hotel Records) Order 1972, does not by itself justify keeping a full image of the document. If a hotel concludes that scanning is necessary, it should restrict access to the images, set a justified retention period and follow a documented deletion procedure, subject to any legal obligation or legitimate need to keep them longer. A scan saved in a shared front desk folder meets none of these conditions.

Breach notification

Under UK GDPR Article 33, a personal data breach must be reported to the ICO without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals' rights and freedoms. Where the breach is likely to result in a high risk, Article 34 also requires informing the affected guests without undue delay. Hotels without a tested notification procedure face a greater risk of delay, because the assessment has to be made while the investigation is still running.

Sanctions depend on the infringements the regulator establishes, their gravity and the procedure followed. An incident does not automatically lead to a fine, but a poorly documented response makes it harder to show that the hotel acted appropriately. See our guide to incident notification duties for the wider picture.

Initial security priorities for hotels

The six controls below are a practical starting point for hotels of any size. They are initial priorities, not a complete baseline. Network segmentation is important, but it is not always the single most effective control: identity protection, vulnerability management, payment security, supplier control and incident response often matter just as much, so weigh them together.

1
Segment network zones and verify them
Separate guest Wi-Fi, POS and payment systems, the PMS, IoT devices and back-office IT. Define which communication paths are allowed, enforce them with routing and firewall policies, and test the separation periodically. VLANs alone are not a control.
2
Protect identities
Require MFA on email and Microsoft 365, PMS administration, remote access and OTA extranets, with phishing-resistant methods for administrators where possible. Use individual accounts and secure account recovery. Stolen front desk credentials are a common starting point in hotel incidents.
3
Manage vulnerabilities
Keep an inventory of PMS, POS, servers, network devices and IoT. Check patch and support status with each vendor, prioritise internet-facing systems and isolate systems that cannot be updated.
4
Train front desk and reservations teams
Run short, regular phishing simulations based on real OTA and guest impersonation scenarios, with a clear way to report suspicious messages. Annual awareness training alone is not enough for teams with high turnover.
5
Define retention per data category
Set and document a retention period for each record type and purpose, review it regularly and delete or anonymise data at the end of the period.
6
Prepare an incident response plan for hotel operations
Cover PMS outage procedures, guest communication, ICO notification within 72 hours where required, supplier contacts and decision rights. Test the plan at least once a year.

Operational continuity deserves its own scenario. If the PMS is unavailable, how does the front desk see today's arrivals, allocate rooms and take payment? Typical answers include offline procedures and forms, a recent export of arrivals and in-house guests stored securely, payment terminals that can work independently of the PMS, a door-lock system that can issue keys locally where it supports this, and a PMS restore that has actually been tested within an agreed time.

Beyond these priorities, a complete programme also covers backup and recovery with protected copies and tested restores, privileged access management, supplier and API security, an up-to-date asset inventory, endpoint and server protection, a defined PCI DSS scope, security monitoring, and joiner, mover and leaver processes so that access ends when staff or suppliers leave.

This article is an executive overview. For more depth, see our hotel cybersecurity risk report 2026, the guide to guest Wi-Fi segmentation, PCI DSS for hotels, the GDPR compliance guide and our incident response plan guide.

Sources: Marriott, update on the Starwood database security incident (4 January 2019); MGM Resorts International, Form 8-K (5 October 2023); ICO, reporting a personal data breach; PCI Security Standards Council.

Frequently asked questions

What are the biggest cybersecurity risks for hotels?

The most common risks are staff credentials stolen through phishing (including fake OTA or guest messages), takeover of OTA extranet and email accounts, ransomware that disrupts the PMS and other operational systems, weaknesses in payment environments, insufficient separation between guest, operational and corporate networks, and uncontrolled remote access by suppliers. Their impact depends on how well identities, networks, backups and suppliers are managed.

Does PCI DSS apply to hotels?

Yes, if the hotel accepts payment cards. Which requirements apply, and how much evidence is needed, depends on the payment methods used, how card data flows through the hotel's systems, which components are outsourced and what the acquirer and card brands require. P2PE terminals, tokenisation or a hosted payment page can reduce the scope considerably, but they do not remove the obligation altogether.

Do hotels need to keep copies of guests' passports?

There is no universal yes or no. Hotels must keep certain guest records, and UK rules require specific details for some guests, but recording the required details is different from keeping a full image of the passport. Any scanning must be justified by purpose, necessity and legal basis, with restricted access, a justified retention period and a documented deletion procedure.

Does every hotel data breach have to be reported to the ICO?

No. A personal data breach must be reported to the ICO within 72 hours unless it is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals. Guests must be told directly when the breach is likely to result in a high risk to them. The hotel should still document every breach and its assessment, including breaches it decides not to report.

What is the biggest cybersecurity risk for a hotel PMS?

Usually the misuse of legitimate access: stolen or shared credentials with more privileges than needed, and poorly protected integrations or supplier accounts. The exposure depends on the architecture, for example whether the PMS is cloud-hosted, uses role-based access and holds only tokenised payment data. Role-based access, strong authentication, protected integrations and monitoring are the core mitigations.

What should a hotel's initial cybersecurity priorities include?

Segmented and tested network zones; MFA and secure account recovery for email, PMS administration, remote access and OTA accounts; vulnerability management; phishing training for front desk teams; documented retention per data category; and an incident response plan that covers PMS outages. A complete programme also needs protected, regularly tested backups, privileged access control, supplier and API security, an asset inventory, monitoring and joiner and leaver processes.

Ryland Deakin
About the author
Lead Consultant, Cyvra · CISM · CompTIA Security+ · MCP

Ryland has delivered cybersecurity, compliance, and IT management programmes for regulated organisations across the UK and the Netherlands for over 20 years. View full profile

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Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, or professional advice. Cyvra makes no warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of this content, which may not reflect the most current regulatory developments. Readers should seek independent legal and regulatory advice appropriate to their specific circumstances. Cyvra accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this content.